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merits.113 Such controversies could be discouraged by requiring the trial
judge to fix the proper attorney's fee in the judgment in cases where it is
proper to award costs, leaving to the clerk or taxing officer the taxation of
only actual disbursements and unimportant items, after entry of judgment.1 4
The precise details in the administration of the reform suggested here are
beyond the scope of a preliminary study, designed broadly to point out the
anomalous condition of the present law of costs, the resulting abuses and a
possible remedy for them. Inevitably, the operation of the procedure can
only be sketched in outline and general meaning; practical application in a
variety of situations would necessarily await the work of the courts. Yet
it may be stated with confidence that the proposed reform would be a sig-
nificant step in the long struggle for better administration of justice.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVATE ACTS
OF CONGRESS
STATUTES which apply to only one or a few named individuals' each year
in the United States outnumber public bills by a large majority." In the state
legislatures this annual barrage of special legislation is laid down in spite of
explicit constitutional restrictions designed to limit the type and number of
special statutes, and in the face of a mass of restrictive case law developed
by the courts.3 Congressional exercise of private-bill functions, on the other
hand, is free from specific constitutional restraint- except for a prohibition
against bills of attainder 4 - and has, to date, apparently been questioned by
the judiciary only four times.5
113. This fear was expressed with reference to the award of counsel fees as an
element of damages in Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 230 (U. S. 1872).
114. That is the civil law practice. See P. R. CoDE CIv. PRoc. § 339.
1. The statutory definition of Congressional private bills includes "bills for the
relief of private parties, bills granting pensions, bills removing political disabilities, and
bills for the survey of rivers and harbors." 33 STAT. 611 (1905), 44 U. S. C. § 189
(1934). A functional classification, however, excludes rivers and harbors bills and includes.
bills which, though catalogued as public, affect directly only one or a few determinable
individuals. For most purposes of this study, the functional definition is controlling. See
LucE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMIS (1935) 532-536.
2. The Seventy-Fifth Congress enacted 834 private and 1410 public bills. But the
proportion in the state legislatures is inverse. See LucE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 545.
3. See Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 351.
4. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
5. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1 (1899); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co. et al., 18 How. 421 (U. S. 1855) ; Paramino Lumber Co. et al. v. Marshall,
27 F. Supp. 823 (D. Wash. 1939), cert. granted, U. S. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 271 (1940);
Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447 (1932).
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This comparative freedom of Congress in the realm of private legislation
is explicable only through a consideration of the narrow range within which
constitutional conflict over the federal private-bill power can arise. From the
beginning, the subject matter of special Congressional legislation has been
limited by the division of governmental activities between state and federal
legislatures.6 In the states, the regulation of corporations, insurance, public
utilities and domestic relations has presented manifold opportunity for the
award of special privilege.7 On the other hand, the sphere of Congressional
legislative activity, so far as private bills are concerned, was confined originally
to the grant of pensions and the allowance of claims, with regulation of the
civil service and of re-issue patents to be added soon after 1800.8
A second limiting factor has been the tendency continually to delegate the
consideration and approval of troublesome classes of private petitions to the
courts or to federal agencies created to administer the relief requiredY Two
impulses have determined this evolution. The volume of private petition for
Congressional favor creates a burden upon legislative time which is impossible
to sustain without generally dispensing with an inquiry into the merits of the
cases presented. 'Moreover, the opportunities for log-rolling between Congress-
men, each with a pocket-full of bills from plaintive constituents, have stimu-
lated demands for a procedure to eliminate at least a portion of the potential
abuse.' 0 The result has been a series of delegations, beginning with an un-
successful attempt to transfer all pension claims to the courts, which has
created a body of federal agencies to assist in the administration of the sover-
eign favor. The first institutional outgrowth of the specialization process was
authorization for a Pension Bureau in the War Department." But even
after the enactment of sweeping military insurance and compensation laws
beginning with 1917,12 pleas for exception to the pension rules have shifted
back to Congress a sizable proportion of the burden so delegated.13 The
6. Compare Art. I, § 8 of the Federal Constitution with the Tenth Amendment.
7. L-ucE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 540-49; CHAmnEUi.IN, LEGISLATIVE PrOCESSES,
NATIONAL AND STATE (1936) 237-242.
8. See, generally, U. S. STATUTES AT LArGE (1862) Vol. 6, which compiles private
acts passed, 1789-1845. Aside from the four large groups of private acts named, there
have been hundreds of miscellaneous types of acts which fit into no particular category
and which seldom recur.
9. Those classes of private petitions which Congress has not delegated to an inde-
pendent agency for consideration are parceled out among the regular committees accord-
ing to subject matter. RULEs OF THE HousE oF REPREsETATivES (1927) §§ 827-32;
SEN.ATE MANUAL (1936) §§ 22-44. Compare with this the highly specialized procedure of
the English Parliament, which in many ways resembles that of a court. DoDD AND WVu.-
BERFORcE, PlIvArz BIL PROCEDURE (1893).
10. See Luce, Petty Bjusiness in Congress (1932) 26 A--. PoL Sct. Rlv. 815; Lucu,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 540-49; MAYo, Somuims, WHAT NmiT? (1934).
11. GLassox, FEuERAL MiLrraRY PENSIONs IN THE UMTED STATEs (1918) 54-97.
VEBER, THE BuREA-u OF PEnSIO'S (1923).
12. 40 STAT. 398 (1917).
13. See generally U. S. STATtTEs AT LARE (1937) Vol. 50.
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situation was particularly bad after the Civil War, when President Cleveland
set a veto record between 1885 and 1889 in the destruction of 228 private
pension bills.14 A second delegation made by Congress to escape the pressure
of private petition was the transfer of the re-issue of patents to a commissioner
in 1836; until then, application for extensions of the original patent privilege
had been made directly to Congress.1r
The doctrine of the sovereign's immunity to suit, inherited from the com-
mon law, had become so prolific a source of maladministration that Congress
in 1855 created a Court of Claims, 16 empowered in 186317 and 188718 to
determine and adjudicate certain restricted classes of contract claims, as well
as to investigate others in an advisory capacity. 19 A series of acts after 1910
authorized settlement of tort claims in limited character and amount by the
federal departments concerned. A Small Claims Act in 1922 extended the
settlement power of all departments to $1,000 in cases of property damage. 20
To date, however, efforts to establish a court to hear all claims in tort against
the Federal Government by permanent waiver of immunity for that purpose
have failed.21
The possibility of constitutional conflict over the private-act power of
Congress, already considerably restricted by limitations on the scope of the
power which result from the division of state and federal activities, and from
delegation to special agencies, has been further reduced by the character of
the majority of current private enactments. Approximately ninety percent
of these enactments authorize payments by the Government.2 2 The remainder
grant costless emoluments, bestow honors, memorialize the dead. The tax-
payer is legally incapable of challenging such incursions on the Treasury 2a
- aside from a resort to the ballot- and no legal interest cognizable in the
courts is created by the award of a decoration, no matter how ill-deserved.24
Private bills of this character are therefore unchallengable in the absence of
a specific provision in the Constitution forbidding the grant of privilege.
The omission of any such provision has thus vastly reduced the probability
of any judicial review of the federal private-bill power. This, however, has
14. See GLASSON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 273-80.
15. See generally BROWN, A BRiEF HSTORY OF PATENT LEGISLATION IN TME UNITED
STATES (1889).
16. 10 STAT. 612 (1855).
17. 12 STAT. 765 (1863).
18. 24 STAT. 505 (1887).
19. The best summary of the development of the Court of Claims appears in an opin-
ion by Booth, Chief Justice, in Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73
Ct. Cl. 447 (1932).
20. 42 STAT. 1066 (1922) 31 U. S. C. § 215 (1934).
21. Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill (1933) 1 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 1. The
largest single class of claims presented to Congress today springs from damage wrought
by government automobiles.
22. See generally U. S. STATUTES AT LARGE (1937) Vol. 50.
23. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
24. At least no case of such a challenge is recorded.
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not been true in the states. There widespread abuses of the power to legislate
for individual cases aroused a storm of hostility to private and other special
types of legislation which swept through America after 1850, leaving consti-
tutional restrictions in the states upon many kinds bf private acts.2 Change
knocked even at the door of Congress in the shape of amendments presented
thirteen times between 1876 and 1909, by which it was hoped to restrain the
private-bill power.26 The collapse of these efforts has left the Federal Consti-
tution free from provisions like those which have so substantially curtailed
the private-bill activities of the state legislatures.
Perhaps the most important factor of all in limiting litigation over private-
bill powers has been the restraint with which Congress has employed its
prerogative. This has been especially important in respect to the enactment
of bills which attempt to alter the legal relations existing between individuals.
Two rough categories of private acts are distinguishable: those which deal
with dearly legislative concerns - the grant of a pension, the promotion of
an employee; and those which fall within the quasi-judicial sphere - a decree
of divorce, the alteration of a judgment. Since, for reasons presented,21 the
former group is unchallengable in the courts, it is in the second area that
Congressional restraint has been most significant.
To date there appear to have been but four instances where the courts
have reviewed Congressional private legislation of a quasi-judicial character.s
Two of the four cases involved attempts by Congress to set aside judgments
rendered by the federal judiciary. In view of the jealous care with which
the courts since McCullough v. Virginia2 9 have protected their decisions from
legislative alteration, it is paradoxical to discover that on both these occasions
they sustained the private statute.
The first of these cases arose when the United States Supreme Court, at
the suit of Pennsylvania, in Mlay, 1852, ordered proprietors of bridges across
the Ohio River near Wheeling to make changes in the structures sufficient
to remove obstructions to navigation.3 0 In August of that same year Congress
by statute announced: "That the bridges . . . are hereby declared to be
lawful structures in their present positions and elevations, and shall be so
held and taken to be, anything in the law or laws of the United States to
the contrary notwithstanding. ' 31 Although this Congressional Act destroyed
the rights of Pennsylvania obtained in the first decree, the Court, in Penn-
25. See CIoe and Marcus, supra note 3.
26. Listed in MusmiANNo, PROPOSED AmEND.MNTs TO Tmn CoTsTrrriox. (1929)
149-50.
27. See p. 714 supra.
28. Cited supra note 5.
29. 172 U. S. 102 (1898).
30. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. ct al., 13 How. 518 (U. S.
1851).
31. 10 STAT. 112 (1852). In form this bill was a rider to an appropriation for the
Post Office Department.
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sylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company,3 2 preserved intact its
theory of judicial supremacy by sacrificing the interests of Pennsylvania.
Declaring the statute constitutional, Mr. Justice Nelson explained that the
original decree was exe6utory only, dependent upon a continuing violation
of the public right for its effect. Since Congress had seen fit to waive the
public right, the nuisance no longer obtained. However, ". . . if the remedy
in this case had been an action at law, and a judgment rendered in favor
of plaintiff for damages, the right to these would have passed beyond the
reach of Congress." 33
The prophetic words of Mr. Justice Nelson remained untested until the
Pocono Pines case in 1932.34 There Congress, in terms, had deprived a suc-
cessful plaintiff of his judgment in the Court of Claims by ordering that
court, in a private statute,3 5 to hear relitigation of the cause. Since the
original judgment had been rendered by the court in its judicial, not its ad-
visory, capacity, the statute was a challenge to the finality of a judicial decree.
Nevertheless, following the technique exemplified in the Wheeling case, the
court avoided a declaration of unconstitutionality by a construction of the
statute which went against the plaintiff. "A pronounced and vitally different
situation" would obtain, the court asserted, had plaintiff procured a valid
judgment against the United States and had Congress "sought to subject its
permanency to the hazard of a new trial. A judgment, if lawful, is property
and so recognized by law."' 38 An indignant dissent pointed out that Congress
had done precisely that, but again the private-bill power had invaded the
judicial province and come away unscathed.
The one rebuke suffered by Congress came in 1899 in the Supreme Court
case of Jones v. Meehan'3 7 some thirty years before the Pocono Pines decision.
There Congress had attempted to invalidate a land title by means of a private
statute.38 In an opinion so terse as to suggest the lack of any doubt upon
the fundamental principle involved, Mr. Justice Gray stated that the property
rights in question "could not be divested by any subsequent action of the
lessor, or by Congress, or of the executive departments."'30
An analysis of these three cases is hardly one upon which to erect cate-
gorical conclusions.40 It is reasonably apparent that the courts may, when
32. 18 How. 421 (U. S. 1855). See Congressional debates in (1852) 25 CoNG. GLoUE
965-1068.
33. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. et al., 18 How. 421, 424 (U. S.
1855).
34. Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447 (1932).
35. 46 STAT. 1622 (1931).
36. Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447, 495-496
(1932).
37. 175 U. S. 1 (1899).
38. 28 STAT. 1018 (1894).
39. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 32 (1899).
40. The only specific reference to private statutes in the literature of the Supreme
Court is a Marshall dictum of 1827 that "There are, undoubtedly, great and solid objec-
tions to legislation for particular cases. But these objections do not necessarily make
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faced with a bald assertion of Congressional power in the judicial sphere,
avoid the shock of open conflict by construing away the offensive features
of a given private bill. It is also reasonably clear that the more certain the
courts become that the threatened private interest is a "property" right, the
more probable a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Recently, the competition of court with legislature has entered new fields.
A contest for the control of administrative tribunals has been fought, by the
legislature with liberal delegations of power to hear and decide; by tile
courts with a consistent effort to impose on the proceedings of administrative
commissions the requirements of judicial due process.4 1
Against this background, in Paramino Lumber Conpany et al. v. Marshall,2
a fourth quasi-judicial exercise of the private-bill power by Congress is recog-
nizable as an attempt to bend the still untested private-statute technique to
new tasks in the field of administrative regulation. On April 10, 1936,
Congress passed a private act 43 for the relief of John T. Clark of Seattle,
initiating a controversy which has now proceeded to the Supreme Court.
Clark, a maritime worker, had been injured in 1931 while at work on board
ship in Seattle harbor, and had received compensation from his employer's
insurer under provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act."
By an order of August 26, 1931, the deputy commissioner at Seattle, charged
with enforcement of the federal act, had ordered Clark's case closed as of
July 4, 1931, when Clark's physician pronounced him recovered. Thirty days
after that date, in accordance with the compensation statute, the award became
final. Subsequent to the termination of the case, Clark's injury reappeared
under circumstances of particular hardship. After considerable investigation,45
Congress was moved to pass the private act in question, which empowered
the deputy commissioner to reopen Clark's case.4  "a additional $4,000 award
followed. An application to enjoin the enforcement of the commissioner's
second order was denied by a three-judge federal district court in Seattle.
such legislation repugnant to the Constitution of the United States." Williams v. Norris,
12 Wheat. 117, 128 (U. S. 1827). Reference was to an act of the legislature of Tennes-
see, not to one of Congress.
41. Note, for example, the tendency of courts to require common law procedural
safeguards in administrative proceedings, discussed in Comment (1931) 80 U. or PA.
L. REv. 96; Olson, Due Process- Notice, Hearbing and Reqiew (1935) 8 So. CALN. L.
Ray. 330; Hanft, Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. Ray. 12.
42. 27 F. Supp. 823 (D. Wash. 1939), cert. oranted, U. S. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 271
(1940).
43. 49 STAT. 2244 (1936).
44. 44 STAT. 1436 (1927), 33 U.S. C. § 901 (1934). In 1934 the act was amended
to extend the time for re-examination in all cases to one year. 48 ST.T. 806, 33 U. S. C.
§ 922 (1934).
45. Szn. REP. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
46. The Clark Bill as originally introduced followed the usual pattern of private-bill
legislation; it authorized payment of an award to Clark from the Treasury. In this form
it would have been impervious to constitutional attack. See 80 Co.NG. RE. 1475-6 (1936).
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Since the only limitation upon the private-bill power of Congress sug-
gested by the courts to date has been the protection due property rights,
either under the doctrine of separate powers, as in the Wheeling case or as
in Jones v. Meehan, by an invocation of the substantive guaranties implicit
in due process, constitutional attack upon the Clark Bill must be phrased in
terms of the Fifth Amendment.4 7
Even the most favorable interpretation of the Bill must recognize that, in
withdrawing from employer and insurer their immunity from further pro-
ceedings, it subjects them to responsibilities not borne by other employers
and insurers similarly situated. There is little doubt that such an enactment
by a state legislature could be found in conflict with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 This remains largely hypothesis,
however, for no application of the equal protection clause by the Supreme
Court has yet been made to state private legislation, probably because state
restrictions on special acts have been adequate. The absence of an equal
protection clause in the Fifth Amendment has prevented the application of
that doctrine to federal private statutes; but since the expansion of due
process of law to the proportions of a substantive guaranty, the courts have
talked loosely of equality of protection as one test of the reasonable treatment
which due process has been made to require. 49 In 1930, this test of due
process was clearly incorporated in the substantive law of the Fifth Amend-
ment by the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway v. United States.50 Even under this case, however, the equal pro-
tection requirement as applied to federal acts is considerably less stringent
than that imposed upon state private acts by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The validity of a state private-bill may be questioned on the sole ground of
equal treatment ;r1 invalidation of a federal statute involves a broader inquiry
in terms of due process, of which equality of treatment is but a part. Thus,
unless the interest threatened is "property" and the power exercised is clearly
unreasonable, a lack of equality of treatment may not justify a declaration
of unconstitutionality.5 2 For that result it is necessary, even under a rigorous
application of the Rock Island case, that the court supplement its finding
of a violation of equal protection by a further decision that the immunity
47. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . ." U. S. CONST., AMEND. V.
48. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U. S. CoNsT., AMEND. XIV.
49. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535 (1884); Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.
S. 462, 468 (1891) ; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 697 (1891); Giozza v. Tiernan,
148 U. S. 657 (1893); United States v. Yount, 267 Fed. 861, 863 (D. Penn. 1920);
United States v. Ballard, 12 F. Supp. 321, 326-7 (D. Ky. 1935); Wallace v. Currin, 95
F. (2d) 856, 867 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
50. 284 U. S. 80 (1931).
51. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 331 (1921).
52. See cases cited supra note 49.
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created by an administrative award is "property" and that this "property"
has been taken without "due process of law."
The real issue in the Paramino case, and the pivotal question in determining
whether any similar private bill of Congress is constitutional or not, is how
far Congress will be permitted to go in re-arranging the award of the com-
pensation commission, and to what extent that award is to be protected from
Congressional meddling by the courts. The issue is discussed in the courts,
however, only in the language of theory. The question is posed as a decision
as to whether the employer's freedom from further proceedings before the
commissioner can be called a "property" interest and therefore protected
from change by Congress; or whether it is to be classed as a legal interest
of lesser status, in which case Congress can be given a free hand with it.
In this discussion the legal interest which was given to Clark's employer and
insurer by the expiration of the 30-day limit on re-opening the case is called
an immunity, and the question becomes then whether this particular kind
of an immunity is "property." In view of the divided authority on the class-
ification of immunities gained by the operation of this sort of limitation, it
may be illuminating to examine the treatment accorded analogous immunities
by the courts.
The most important class of similar immunities which have been studied
by the courts are those created when a statute of limitations cuts off a civil
right of actionY3 No distinction need be made between public and private
acts in these cases, for in either event the concern of the courts is the ex-tent
to which the legislature is to be allowed to go, and whether public or private
the act will be unconstitutional if the immunity is called property. In actions
involving real property, potential defendants receive an immunity from liti-
gation after the expiration of the statute of limitations of which the legis-
lature may not deprive them by retroactive extension of the statuterit But
an immunity from the litigation of a contract claim is not so protected by
the federal courts,m5 although there are many state authorities to the con-
trary.r6 Dictum by Mr. Justice Butler in Dancr v. Gulf & Ship Island Rail-
road57 suggdsts a classification of immunities along such lines as these: an
immunity from litigation of a claim founded on common-law rights is not
protected from destruction by the legislature as property under the Fifth
Amendment; an immunity from litigation of a claim of statutory origin is
property. The theoretical explanation of this distinction is that common law
rights exist even after the statute of limitations e.x'pires, with merely their
enforcement barred; whereas statutory rights cease to be at the end of the
53. See cases cited infra notes 54-58.
54. Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U. S. 403 (1935).
55. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885); cf. Home Ins. Co. cf at. v. Dick cf al.,
281 U. S. 397 (1930), which, if applied, apparently would overrule Campbell v. Holt.
56. Collected in (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1316.
57. 268 U. S. 633 (1924).
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period designating their span of effectiveness. It follows that the revival of a
statutory claim involves, as that of a common-law claim does not, the creation
of new rights and duties - a result which, if achieved retrospectively, deprives
the party proceeded against of his immunity, which, the doctrine further
assumes, "vested" in him at the expiration of the legal relations created by
the statute. 5s This classification fails to take into account the unanimous ap-
plication of the property tag, by the federal courts, 9 to immunities arising
from limitations on the litigation of claims to real property - common law
rights.
The contradictory judicial treatment accorded immunities created by the
operation of a statute of limitations on civil rights of action is reflected in
cases which involve, like the Paramino case, an immunity created by a statute
limiting the time during which the review of a compensation award may be
applied for. The courts speak of "vested" rights when they wish to uphold the
immunity against any attempt of the legislature to extend the limitation
retrospectively. If the courts wish to give effect to the legislative purpose,
the extension of the limitation on review is called a "procedural" change. "The
rights of parties cannot be changed by legislation, but no party has a vested
right in any particular remedy." 60 At least eight cases in state courts, both
within and without the private bill field, where the issue of the Paramino
case is involved, have used the vested right doctrine to invalidate the legis-
lative extension of statutes which limited the time for review of an original
compensation award.61
Massachusetts has flatly defined the immunity imparted by expiration of
the time for readjustment as a vested right, 2 apparently overlooking early
liberal constructions of statutes of limitation in the opinions of Mr. justice
Holmes . 3 Illinois aligned itself with Massachusetts in 1924. 64 A large num-
ber of decisions give effect to the policy against legislative alteration of the
limiting period by construing away the offensive features in statutes which
attempt to suspend the limitation; but almost unanimously the opinion is
expressed that, were circumvention impossible, the court would employ the
58. This is outlined in The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886). A contrary view as
to compensation statutes, with a summary of authorities in the compensation field which
follow this reasoning, is contained in Pine v. Industrial Comm., 148 Okla. 200, 298 Pac.
276 (1931).
59. See note 54 supra.
60. Willard v. Harvey, 24 N. H. 344, 352 (1852).
61. Cited infra notes 62-66.
62. Casieri's Case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N. E. 118 (1934); Ziccardi's Case, 287 Mass.
588, 192 N. E. 29 (1934).
63. Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. E. 1033 (1901) ; Dunbar v.
Boston & P. R. R., 181 Mass. 383, 63 N. E. 916 (1902).
64. Arnold & Murdock v. Industrial Comm. et al., 314 Ill. 251, 145 N. E. 342 (1924).
But cf. Illinois cases cited infra note 70.
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"property" technique.65 Attempts by the legislatures of Oregon and Montana
to intervene in compensation cases in order to permit a re-examination ot
the award have fallen before constitutional restrictions on special legislation.co
If the immunity created by the 30-day limitation in the Paramino case
were to be described by the Supreme Court in the language oi these state
cases, there would be little doubt that Congress, in enacting the private statute
which deprived employer and insurer of that immunity, had taken from them
"property." But cases reaching a contrary result upon precisely the same
issue are equally numerous. In Independcnt Picr Compazy v. .Votor',GT
a case involving the identical federal statute of the Para;;no case, the em-
ployee received compensation under the act by virtue of an order which
became final April 2, 1934. On May 26, 1934, Congress amended the Act,
providing for reopening of any case within a year after the last payment. The
limitation in effect had closed the case on May 2.s The pro.ceodingi were
re-opened, but the employer, judge Dickinson ruled, was not deprived of
anything that was protected by due process. Similarly, New York has refused
to recognize this immunity as worthy of protection from retrospective with-
drawal, 9 and Illinois, in 1926, reversed its decision of two years before and
initiated a line of cases, a larger group than those of any other jurisdiction,
which regard retroactive changes in the limiting period of compensation awards
as only procedural in nature.70
So wide a divergence of authority renders extremely difficult any general-
ization as to whether the immunity gained Joy Clark's employer and insurer
may be classed as a property right, given the protection of the due process
clause and protected against the private bill of Congress. Yet it is on the
determination of these questions that the validity of that private statute, and
of all private statutes in this field, is most likely to depend.
Equally difficult is an approach to the private-bill power through the realm
of the separation of judicial from legislative functions, although that attempt
65. Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, 150 S. E. 78 (1929); Dashiell v. Holland Maide
Candy Shops et al., 171 MCId. 72, 188 At. 29 (1936) ; Holton v. Standard Sanitary Mfg.
Co., 189 Atl. 194 (Md. 1937); Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 50 Wyo. 462,
62 Pac. (2d) 287 (1936).
66. Roles Shingle Co. v. Bergerson ct al., 142 Ore. 131, 19 P. (2d) 94 (1933); State
ex rel. Roundup Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Bd., 94 Mont. 3S, 23 P. (2d)
253 (1933).
67. 12 Fed. Supp. 974 (D. Penn. 1935).
68. See note 44 supra.
69. Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 23S N. Y. 271, 144 N. . 579 (1924);
appeal dismissed, 271 U. S. 649, 46 Sup. Ct. 636 (1926); Montgomery v. Seneca Iron &
Steel Co., 236 App. Div. 19 (3d Dep't 1932); Decker v. Pouvailsmith Corp., 252 N. Y.
1, 168 N. E. 442 (1929).
70. Superior Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'r. 321 Ill. 240, 151 N. E. 890 (1926);
Smolen v. Industrial Comm'r, 324 Ill. 32, 154 N. E. 441 (1926) ; Snowden & McSweeney
Co. v. Industrial Comm. et al., 324 Ill. 423, 155 N. E. 277 (1927); Chicago Bd. of Un-
der-writers v. Industrial Comm. e al., 332 Ill. 611, 164 N. E. 216 (1928); Perry Coal Co.
v. Industrial Comm. et al., 343 Ill. 525, 175 N. E. 801 (1931).
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is suggested by the Wheeling decision. Compensation commissions exercise
many of the attributes of courts, yet are closely controlled by Congress in
respects which preclude their classification as a portion of the judiciary.71
There is very little doubt that the judgment of a court, in spite of the Wheeling
and Pocono cases, would be upheld against a direct attack by Congress in
the shape of private legislation, provided escape by construction were not
possible.7 2 But it does not necessarily follow that the ruling of a federal
compensation commission is entitled to that protection.
The variation in treatment accorded immunities from review of compensa-
tion awards suggests, as urged before the examination of that treatment was
entered upon, that the real issues involve a tacit decision as to how far the
legislative body which seeks to interfere will be permitted to go before receiv-
ing judicial rebuff. The constitutionality of private acts of Congress which
touch upon the administrative area is thus made to depend upon a calculation
of the desirable relation between administrative tribunals, the courts and
the legislature, which will probably be, nevertheless, expressed in terms of
vested rights or procedural remedies. 73
Since considerations like these may be expected to govern the decision
of cases where Congress has exercised its private-bill power in quasi-judicial
areas, constitutionality or unconstitutionality is predictable only upon a study
of the hardship imposed in any particular case, modified by what the court
may consider politically expedient. In cases like Paramino v. Marshall where,
through compulsory insurance of the entire industry against compensation
losses, the imposition of the additional award provided for by private act
results actually in equality of treatment rather than discrimination, a declara-
tion of invalidity is hardly to be expected.
The growing complexity of administrative regulation, coupled with a ten-
dency in the courts to limit the discretion of administrative officers wherever
possible, demonstrates that it is in precisely such situations as that created
by Clark's injury that the almost unexplored private-bill power of Congress
can be of importance in eliminating injustices inherent in any legislation cut
to a universal pattern. The adjustment of individual cases in the light of
the purposes for which particular quasi-legislative tribunals were established
is, potentially, a desirable reservation of Congressional power which may
offset the inevitable tendency of the courts to force administrative remedies
71. The Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) refused to treat
federal compensation commissions as courts for purposes of determining their own juris-
diction. The tenure and salary of deputy commissioners are entirely within the con-
trol of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, and therefore of the
executive and legislative departments. 44 STAT. 1443 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §940 (1934).
See, on this problem, Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 405,
583.
72. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102 (1898).
73. Comment (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 677, 683 urges that the considerations are
always of the separation of powers, though expressed in terms of due process.
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into inflexible forms. Like all private-bill functions it is subject to political
abuse and, should the volume of petitions grow markedly, may require more
time than Congressional committees can profitably give.
So far as the cases reveal, it appears that the constitutionality of any par-
ticular private bill can be challenged only on the ground that it goes too far
in interfering with the finality of judicial decisions. In any case this limitation
may be offset, as in the Wheeling and Pocono cases, by political considera-
tions, or as is likely in the Paranidno case, by a calculation of the practical
benefits and real detriments which it distributes.
